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MARKETING COOPERATIVES AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
1 Introduction
Agricultural and horticultural cooperatives operate nowadays in a rapidly changing
environment. The Dutch Cooperative Council (NCR, 1990) distinguishes three developments.
Production of a large number of products has reached self-sufficiency at the level of the
European Union. Many markets are not characterized by shortages anymore, but by firms
having large inventories or idle capacity. The agricultural policy of the EC tries to cope with
this situation of overproduction by adopting instruments like quotation, leave fallow, lower
prices and less subsidized exports. The implication of these policies for firms is that expensive
adjustments have to be made in order to eliminate excess capacity. A second development
is that a different product assortment is required in order to be successful in a market which
has changed from a sellers market to a buyers market. Strategies like expansion of production
and competition on the basis of prices are nowadays less important than product differenta-
tion, market segmentation, specialisation and diversification. Finally, the emergence of the
internal market in Europe induced many merger activities which has resulted in a few large,
multinational private corporations. These developments are not uniquely dutch or european.
Californian cooperatives also face consumers demanding more variety and markets which
expand rapidly by transcending national borders due to trade agreements like NAFTA.
These developments have increased the demand for funds by cooperatives. First,
product differentiation and diversification are necessary to meet the changing demand by
consumers. It requires large sums of money. Second, the increasing size of markets has
resulted in a few large players. Cooperatives try to prevent that the strength of their bargaining
position decreases in favor of multinationals and concentrated retailers. However, they have
problems to adopt the same policy as multinational corporations because financial funds are
mostly acquired by retained earnings. This way of financing expansions is viable in slowly
growing markets, but it has a hard time to deal with a jump in market size of the extent of
european integration or NAFTA. They have been able to generate these funds up till now
mainlyby designingnewinternal financialinstrumentsthru relaxingthe requirementsregarding
liability and exit. However, empirical evidence (van Dijk and Poppe, 1992) indicates that the
limits to the sources of selffinancing seem to be almost reached. The use of external funds
like bank debt and outside equity seems inevitable. External funds may be acquired by issuing
equity
1 or using debt or some hybrid source of funds.
The NCR (1990) identifies the domination of control by the members of the cooperative
as the prime distinguishing feature of this organizational form. Dutch law provides possibilities
for securing control by members (ter Woorst, 1989) because it provides the possibility that the
members write in their charter that ’up to two thirds of the boards of directors may be
appointed from the members of the cooperative’. This definition allows for more cooperative
forms than the ones surveyed in Bonin, Jones and Putterman (1993). The labor managed firm
or production cooperative (PC) and the investor owned or conventional firm (CF) are analysed
in their paper. A PC is characterized by worker participation in firm decision making, profit
sharing and employee ownership. Worker’s decisionmaking right is a necessary condition in
their definition. However, PCs are relatively rare in the Netherlands, whereas the agricultural
1 The pharmacist cooperative OPG was the first cooperative in the Netherlands to do so in 1992.3
and horticultural cooperatives are common.
2 These latter cooperatives are like a CF, with the
difference that it is mainly financed by the input suppliers or buyers of the output. One way
of defining an agricultural or horticultural cooperative is that it is either a certain group of input
suppliers or a certain group of customers which owns a CF at another stage in the production
column (marketing chain), either upstream (a purchasing cooperative) or downstream (a
marketing cooperative). We restrict ourselves to marketing cooperatives in this article and refer
to them as MC. Notice that the members of a MC own and decide upon the assets of a MC,
but that the MC doesn’t have any ownership rights regarding the assets of individual
members which are used at the upstream stage. Another way of formulating this feature is that
each member of a MC owns assets at two stages of production. First, the farmer makes his
own investment decisions and owns the resulting assets at his farm (the upstream stage).
Second, the ownership of the assets which are used to process the produce of farmers at the
downstream stage is in the hands of all the members of the MC together. Figure 1
summarizes the differences between the PC, MC and CF mode of organization.
Organizational form
Residual claimant PC MC CF
Input suppliers no yes no
Employees yes no no
Figure 1: Organizational forms
Nourse (1922) explained the vertical integration aspect of a MC already along the
nowadays familiar lines of transactions-related costs associated with asset specificity
3 or sunk
costs of investments at the farm (Williamson, 1985):
’Let us say that a small fruit-producing section has just been
brought to bearing. The area is far from any large market, the
product is perishable, and hence both risk and expense are
high. Volume is not large enough to attract a private distributor.
But success or failure, the salvaging of their investment, or the
continuance of their life work may be at stake on the part of the
growers. Hence it is argued (and demonstrated in practice) that
the cooperative association of producers frequently achieves
results where private outside entrepreneurship fails.’
Ex post opportunistic behavior regarding the contract terms by one’s trading partners (i.e.
post-harvest ’hold-ups’) is reduced by vertical integration (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).
2 There are nowadays substantial differences in market share, from 100% in potato starch production, 90% in credit,
85% for coops in diary processing to ± 38% in meat processing and purchase coops. Purchase and selling coops
play a dominating role in trading and processing of agricultural products in the Netherlands. Due to economies of
scale and scope in production and marketing as well as the need to decrease the costs of governance and control,
there has been a big concentration tendency. In the period 1975-1993 the number of coops dropped by more than
40% to 1048 (Zwanenberg, 1993). The value of current sales is around $ 37 billion. (The credit cooperative
accounts for 744 cooperatives with annual sales around $ 17 billion.)
3 Williamson (1985) distinguishes four kinds of asset specificity: site specificity, physical asset specificity, human
asset specificity and dedicated assets.4
Another advantage is that the downstream part of the MC has lower transaction costs in
acquiring inputs.
There are also issues of asset specificity regarding the non-farm investments of the
MC. MCs face a trade off between reducing post-harvest holdups of highly perishable farm
products and getting attractive terms on outside funds for the investments of the downstream
part of the MC. We will focus on the investments at the downstream part of the MC and argue
that the increasing level of asset specificity, especially investments in brand names, has
reduced the viability of the MC.
4 Hypotheses are formulated regarding the
- difference in financial structure between a MC and a CF;
- difference between dutch and american MCs and CFs;
- viability of the MC as an organizational form.
A cooperative, like any other organization, has to take into account which other parties
are associated with it, like owners, suppliers, consumers and labor. MCs and CFs are
expected to react differently to their environment due to their different objectives. The
members of a MC are special in the sense that they are both suppliers of raw materials and
capital. A member of a cooperative in his role of supplier of raw materials is interested in
receiving a high price for his input, the produce of the MC and the invested capital and likes
to pay a low remuneration to the suppliers of capital. Their interests as a provider of funds are
different, i.e. low prices of raw materials and a high return on capital. These considerations
result in a different objective function of members of a MC than those of shareholders of a CF.
A successful cooperative is a unique construction: the triad of (common) interest, (common)
finance and (common) control, realized in a two fold construction: a society (of members) and
a company (economic institution). Organizations are therefore viewed as a cluster of attributes
between which complementarities have to be realized (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990 and
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1994).
The implications of the feature of member domination in MCs is analysed from a
contract theoretic perspective. Starting point in the economic theory of contracts is a conflict
of interest between the parties (owner of the firm and supplier of external financial funds) and
asymmetric information (firm has superior information regarding the circumstances of
production). The guiding principle regarding financial issues is that differences between
financial instruments can be explained best by analysing the incentives of the various parties.
Financial instruments differ because they imply different incentives for the parties involved.
The relationship between financial structure and organizational form is established by the
observation that both involve a certain allocation of control rights. This implies that the choice
of financial structure and organizational form will respond to a change in the optimal level of
asset specificity, which is due to changing market circumstances.
Another way of characterizing our results is to formulate them as a contribution to the
Coase program. The celebrated Coase theorem (1960) states that every assignment of
property rights results in a Pareto efficient allocation in the absence of bargaining inefficiencies
and wealth constraints. The implied research agenda is that a fruitful starting point for
research on organizations consists of the investigation of the assumptions of efficient
bargaining and/or no wealth constraints. This paper addresses the viability of the MC by
analyzing the impact of the lack of sufficient funds (wealth constraint) of MC members on the
outcome of an efficient bargaining process between the parties associated with a MC
regarding the level of asset specificity of new investments. Insufficient funds may prevent that
a MC realizes a Pareto improvement in the allocation of control rights.
Section 2 identifies several stylized facts of a MC. Organizational choice and financial
4 Many aspects of MCs are not dealt with in this article, but are addressed in the literature, e.g. competitive
yardstick (Nourse, 1922), stability (Sexton, 1986), entry (Sexton and Sexton, 1987), spatial dimensions (Sexton,
1990) and ethical attitudes (Zusman, 1993).5
structure features of the transaction costs and incomplete contracts literature are presented
in section 3. These perspectives are used in section 4 to address the differences between a
MC and a CF. Section 5 derives comparative statics results. A conclusion and some avenues
for future research are formulated in section 6. The appendix provides a formal relationship
between the two branches of theory outlined in section 3.
2 Stylized facts of marketing cooperatives
MCs exist in many variations. This is to a large extent due to differences in the nature
of their produce, e.g. milk is collected every day, whereas potatoes are harvested only during
a certain season. However, there are also quite a few commonalities between MCs. This
section lists several stylized facts of MCs and provides a detailed account of its governing
bodies. These empirical regularities will be elaborated upon and explained in the following
sections.
The residual claimants of MC (,i.e. the input suppliers) are usually faced with a number
of obligations that differ from those of residual claimants of a CF. Five financial differences are
distinguished. Members of a MC
- have a large personal financial stake in the MC, because a considerable share of the
profits is added to the internal financial reserves of the MC each year;
- are to a certain extent personally responsible for financial losses
5;
- are faced with the non-transferability of return claims during the membership period (, i.e.
’money in the dead hand’);
- don’t face in general financial barriers to acquire membership. New members have
immediately costless access to the resources of the MC and have the same rights as
established members to the returns when the MC is liquidated;
- do face exit barriers.
Two closely related differences regarding the product portfolio are distinguished. Members of
aM C
- are usually organized around one raw material, e.g. potatoes, sugar, beets, wheat, milk,
etc.
6;
- are reluctant to diversify the product portfolio of the MC.
Five organizational differences are observed. Members of a MC
- have in many cases 100% delivery requirement of their inputs to the MC;
- enjoy 100% purchase assurance of their produce by the MC;
- are faced with an increasing average age of their members due to declining entry of new,
young members;
- allocate voting power according to one member, one vote;
- face institutional differences regarding the Board of Directors.
Ter Woorst (1989) describes several institutional differences between a MC and a CF. The
Dutch law requires that the cooperative has a General Assembly, a Board of Directors and
a Financial Control Committee. The General Assembly is the most important, because
ultimately it determines the policy of the cooperative and evaluates the execution of the policy
by the Board. In many cases, because of the large number of members and the vast region
5 MCs in the USA don’t have this feature. A recent dutch example in which this feature was exercised is in the dairy
MC Heino Krause (NRC Handelsblad, 1994). Each member had to pay about $ 200.000 to banks in order to
relinquish a huge debt, which was mainly due to mismanagement.
6MCs in California and the Netherlands have this feature, whereas MCs in de Midwest of the USA don’t. The focus
of this paper is on the former MCs.6
of the cooperative, regional committees are elected which form together the General
Assembly. (This is often called the Members Council
7.) The General Assembly chooses the
members of the Board and the Financial Control Committee and has the power to replace
them. Members of the Board and the Financial Control Committee are almost always
members of the cooperative. One explanation is that their own financial interest coincides with
that of the other members. This secures members’ trust in the Board. The Board is ultimately
responsible for the governance of the MC, culminating in the exclusive authority to determine
the prices, dividends, or tariffs paid to or by the members. However, though the Board actively
determines the strategic decisions and interferes with major organizational ones if necessary,
a Directorate is appointed to run the company in its day to day operational business. In regular
joint meetings the Board monitors the Directorate, discusses possible options, decides on
those and gives clear instructions to the Directorate. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships
between the different bodies in a MC.
Figure 2: The organization of a cooperative
There are three important differences between CFs and MCs regarding the Board of
Directors in the Netherlands. Cooperatives don’t transfer the ultimate approval of the annual
account to the Board of Directors. Secondly, they also don’t leave the right of appointing
members of the Board of Directors to the Board of Directors itself.
8 The General Assembly
takes care of these tasks. Finally, the Dutch law on cooperatives secures member control
because it allows that up to two thirds of the members of the Board of Directors are appointed
7 Its size varies between 80 and 150 persons and it consists of members only.
8 A board of directors in large CF in the Dutch setting is an in-group which selects its own successors (principle
of cooptation). Shareholders can only by majority vote not accept a candidate. They have no active rights to appoint
one or, in many cases, even to propose one.7
by the General Assembly of a MC.
9
3 Property rights
This section will analyze the choice of organizational form and financial instruments
from a rights of control perspective. The main ingredients are a conflict of interests and the
observation that not every possible contingency can realistically be described in a contract.
Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that ownership structure can be best
understood in terms of the control rights that it confers. Debt and equity are besides financial
instruments also governance instruments in this approach. Section 3.1 recalls the familiar
transaction costs economics relationship between the mode of exchange and the nature of
investment.
10 Section 3.2 focusses on the control aspects of financial instruments and relates
them to the nature of investment. Section 3.3 focusses on the incomplete contracts literature
because it is more specific about the forces driving financial governance than transaction costs
economics.
3.1 Transaction cost economics and organizational governance
An organization is viewed as a nexus of incomplete contracts with employees,
managers, suppliers, buyers, financiers, and so on. The incompleteness of contracts causes
ex post bargaining problems (transaction costs) in situations where parties make irreversible,
specific investments, i.e. choose assets which have a higher value within the relationship than
outside it. The ex post bargaining positions will depend on the particular organizational form.
Markets and hierarchies are the two extremes on a continuum of possible organizational
forms. The governance costs of exchange of goods and services via markets (M(k)) entails
relatively low costs when the specificity of assets k is low. No bureaucratic apparatus is
required to exercise control and implement changes, i.e. the start-up costs are low. The
competitive forces in a market also provide the incentives to make the right decisions.
However, the governance costs of markets increase relatively fast when the specificity of
assets increases. Adaptations are more slowly when the bilateral dependency increases,
because the bargaining process has to result in an agreement which everybody accepts. The
reverse holds for hierarchies. Governance cost H(k) of a hierarchy are relatively high at a low
level of asset specificity because a bureaucratic apparatus has to be set up. However, more
flexible responses are possible in unforeseen contingencies than in markets in situations with
a high level of asset specificity, because those who hold the residual decision rights are
allowed to make decisions (intervene selectively). The governance costs X(k) of hybrid
organisaties, like franchises and joint ventures, are represented by a pattern which is in
between. They have on the one hand more incentives to perform well compared the
hierarchies, but on the other hand they face more rules and restrictions than markets. The
9 There are also differences between Anglo-Saxon and Germanic board of directors (Moerland, 1994). Anglo-Saxon
Boards of Directors have a one-tier system, in which executive managers and outside experts are respresented.
Boards of Directors in Germanic countries have a two-tier board system, consisting of an executive board and a
supervisory board. (The law specifies certain requirements regarding employee representatives in the supervisory
board.) Insiders and outsiders have been separated in a two-tier system, which may resolve some of the problems
noted by Jensen (1993). However, the principle of cooptation in the executive board in The Netherlands seems to
offset the advantages of the two-tier system regarding the effectiveness of the executive board (Boot, 1994).
10 This article employs the asset specificty branch of transaction cost economics. Barzel (1982) advocates a focus
on measurement problems. Empirical evidence has to tell which approach is most suitable in agricultural and
horticultural markets.8
above observations are summarized by H(0) > X(0) > M(0) and H‘ < X‘ < M‘, where H(k)
(X(k),M(k)) represents the costs of hierarchical (hybrid, market) governance as a function of
the level of asset specificity k. Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration. It implies immediately
that for projects with low levels of asset specificity markets, for intermediate levels of asset
specificity hybrid organizations and for high levels of asset specificity hierarchies are
predicted.
Figure 3: Organizational form and asset specificity (Williamson, 1991)
3.2 Transaction cost economics and financial governance
Williamson (1988) approaches the choice of financial instruments from the same
perspective as the choice of organizational form. Each financial instrument specifies certain
control rights and how returns depend on outcomes. Debt is characterized by rigid rules, like
interest payments at fixed intervals in time, liquidity tests, pay back requirement at the end of
the term, and the creditor has claim priority in the contingency of bankruptcy. The rigidity of
the rules governing debt means that they apply to all possible contingencies. It implies that
the start-up costs of the design of a debt contract are low and that its costs rise sharply with
an increase in the level of asset specificity. Equity is a governance structure in which
financiers are given rights of control. Outside equity assigns financiers the role of residual
claimants in good as well as bad times, there is no pay back date and a Board of Directors
is appointed. This Board gives financiers confidence that their resources will be used in their
interests and will result in lower cost of capital than debt in situations with a high level of asset
specificity
11. Equity is more complex than debt because all kinds of control mechanisms have
to be developed, i.e. provisions regarding the course of action have to be developed for
different contingencies
12. The startup costs of equity are therefore higher than those of debt.
The claims regarding start-up costs entail that 0 < D(0) < E(0), where D(k) (E(k)) is the costs
11 Section 5.2 will address the differences between equity in the Netherlands and the USA.
12 An example is the Dutch dairy cooperative Campina Melkunie: 700 out of the 11,000 members are engaged in
a local administrative function (Jansen and Wantenaar, 1992).9
of debt (equity) as a function of the level of asset specificity. The costs of both financial
instruments show a positive relationship with the level of asset specificity, but the costs of debt
increase faster than the cost of equity. The rigid character of rules associated with debt is
responsible for this feature.
13 These observations imply that D‘ > E‘ > 0.
Only two financial instruments have been distinguished: debt and equity. There are
also hybrid forms, which have characteristics of both debt and equity. The costs of these
financial governance structures are also a function of the degree of asset specificity. They are
indicated by Y(k), where D(0) < Y(0) < E(0) and D‘ > Y‘ > E‘ (Williamson, 1988). Figure 4
represents these properties. The choice of financial instrument is determined by the nature
of investment. The prediction is that debt will be used for projects with a low level of asset
specificity (k<k3), whereas equity will be used when the degree of asset specificity is high
(k>k4). Hybrid financial governance structures are expected for intermediate levels of asset
specificity (k3<k<k4).
Figure 4: Financial governance structure and asset specificity
3.3 Incomplete contracts
The starting point in the incomplete contracts literature is the same as in transaction
cost economics: it is too expensive to describe all possible contingencies in a contract and to
formulate an agreement for every possible situation. Contracts are incomplete in the sense
that only the most prominent eventualities are usually described in the real world. Unforeseen
contingencies are covered in an incomplete contract by assigning somebody the rights of
control. This implies that contracts will not only consist of financial instruments based on
verifiable information, but will also specify decision power in situations which are not explicitly
13 Gertner, et. al. (1994) argue that internal capital providers also experience stronger incentives to monitor than
providers of external capital because they own the business unit, whereas the latter don’t. The gains from
monitoring are therefore higher for the former than the latter.10
covered by the contract.
14
Aghion and Bolton (1992) stress a conflict of interest, the incompleteness of ex ante
financial contracts and a wealth constraint. The allocation of control rights is important from
an efficiency point of view in a world of incomplete contracts when there is a conflict of interest
between the investor (provider of funds) and the members of the MC (entrepreneurs). It entails
a trade-off between the optimality of ex ante investments and ex post efficiency. Each financial
structure implies a certain control structure. Investor control (voting equity) is attractive in
satisfying ex ante investment constraints regarding the provision of funds. However, it doesn’t
guarantee ex post efficiency, because the wealth constrained entrepreneur is not always able
to establish Pareto improvements in the ex post renegotiation proces. (The wealth constraint
reflects the need of the members of a MC to borrow funds.) The attractive feature of
entrepreneurial control (non-voting equity) is that the investor doesn’t face any wealth
constraint in the ex post renegotiation process. This results in ex post efficiency. However, the
investor might not recoup his ex ante investment and therefore not adopt surplus generating
projects. Debt is the third financial instrument. It involves contingent control because the
results determine who is allowed to decide. The entrepreneur decides as long as things go
well, whereas decision power switches to the debtor when financial obligations can’t be met.
Contingent control may be a desirable financial instrument because it may improve upon either
the ex post efficiency problem of investor control or the ex ante participation problem
associated with entrepreneurial control. The size of inefficiencies differs between financial
instruments and determines the range of projects, in terms of the level of asset specificity k,
which will be carried out by a particular form of finance. The optimal financial structure
consists of a combination of financial instruments such that the residual decision rights are
14 The similarity between the complete and incomplete contract literature is that incentive considerations are the
main issue. Complete contracting analyses emphasize the return aspects of financial instruments. An example is
the model by Jensen and Meckling (1976) in which securities only vary in the terms of income streams. The
manager decides (i.e. has the control rights) in all circumstances, regardless the composition of the capital
structure. This is in sharp contrast with the incomplete contracting framework, where issues of property rights and
rights of control are the focus of analysis.
Notice that the complete contracting approach has some implications for the financial structure of MC.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that external equity is not attractive from a cost minimization point of view.
External financiers know that their provision of funds will reduce the marginal costs of non-profit maximizing
activities of managers. Their response is to increase the rate at which funds will be made available. This
observation applies to the members of a MC because their objective function is not completely aligned with those
of external financiers, as has been pointed out in section 1. The right incentives for cost minimization are provided
when the members of the cooperative are the sole residual claimants. This is established by external funds
completely consisting of debt. Debt requires a fixed amount of money which has to be paid back after some time.
The remaining loss or profit is on account of the cooperative. Financial structure also affects investment. A feature
of debt associated with a CF is limited liability, i.e. shareholders are not personally responsible for paying back the
loan when the organization goes bankrupt. This encourages the choice of unnecessary risky projects. Bankruptcy
costs are carried by the providers of the external funds, whereas successes accrue to the owners. These
considerations reduce the attractiveness of debt in favor of equity. Members of a MC have personal liability, i.e.
they are to a certain extent personally responsible for payments in the case of bankruptcy. This limits the adoption
of risky projects by MC. (This is one explanation for the stylized fact that a MC usually concentrate on one input,
because it reduces the portfolio of candidate projects.) The optimal financial structure takes both cost minimization
and investment selection issues into account. Both aspects point towards a higher debt/equity ratio for MCs than
CFs. This conclusion is supported in the transaction costs/incomplete contracting framework for k e [k3
MC,k 3
CF], i.e.
a MC has more debt, and k e [k4
CF,k4
MC], i.e. a MC has less equity.11
allocated in each unforeseen contingency to the right person
15.
4 Cooperatives versus corporations
This section formulates differences between MCs and CFs regarding their organiz-
ational form and financial structure. Section 4.1 and 4.2 will analyze several instruments which
have the potential to discipline discretionary behavior regarding the use of funds by managers
of either a MC or a CF. Democratic decision making and control systems are analysed.
Section 4.3 addresses financial differences.
4.1 Democratic decision making
MCs are usually organized around one product. This is viewed as a basic element for
a succesful cooperative, because it creates a common clearly perceived interest and a
resulting common willingness of producers with a weak market position to work together. In
case: combined processing of products realizes economies of scale and substantially
combined product supply realizes higher prices. It enhances a very clear and straightforward
way of accounting costs and benefits and of distributing the results, so that members can
control the company effectively. The one product feature supports and strengthens the
’organized trust’ perception of a MC, which facilitates decision making.
A disadvantage of democratic decision making in a MC is that the process of opinion-
and decisionmaking regarding important policy shifts is more time consuming than in other
organizational forms. This problem seems to be increasing when markets become more
complex.
There are also problems in a strategic context. First, a consequence of the time
consuming democratic decision making process is the wide spread practice of MCs to
determine and fix their input price once a year. Members want to know and cash this price,
which is the remuneration of their deliveries to the MC, as soon as possible. A first mover
disadvantage in the competition with rivals is implied, especially when a MC has a high market
share. A rival CF finds itself in a comfortable position in that it is able to choose its price later,
sometimes at a different level. Second, an increase in the degree of asset specificity (k)
exacerbates the disadvantages a MC has to face. Investments with a higher k entail less
involvement of the members, because they lack the specific knowledge to form an opinion and
give their fiat. Higher outlays are therefore required for a well functioning democratic process
of decision making and the preservation of the ’organized trust’. The process of decision-
making will also take more time because the degree of complexity probably increases with a
higher level of asset specificity, especially in a globalizing economy. Third, if k increases
15 Notice the difference between Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Williamson (1988). The first authors consider non-
voting and voting equity as the two extreme financial instruments in the sense that they are unilateral control
allocations. Debt is considered an intermediate financial instrument in terms of control rights because it involves
a contingent allocation of control. Williamson doesn’t include non-voting equity in his analysis. However, it is
straightforward to incorporate this ’no-strings attached’ source of funds P(k) in figure 5. Define P(k) such that
P(0) < D(0)and P’ > D’.Asecond differenceis theimplied’pecking-order theory’offinancial governancestructures.
It has just been pointed out, and is immediate from figure 4, that this depends on the degree of asset specificity
in Williamson. No such relationship emerges from the model of Aghion and Bolton. The monetary returns, non-
pecuniary private benefits and the probability of the signal regarding the underlying state determine the pecking-
order. The ordering is independent of the level of asset specificity. This result is due to the highly stylized nature
of their model, which has only two states of nature and two possible actions. However, some of the other costs of
the use of financial instruments delineated by Williamson can be incorporated in their model. (The appendix
establishes a formal relationship between these two approaches.) We will use figure 5 in the analysis of the institu-
tional complementarities between financial governance and organizational governance.12
without a direct relation with the original activities of the MC (and thereby with the basic
activities of the members), members will be more pessimistic regarding the corresponding
value and risks than shareholders of a CF. This causes reluctancy amongst members to
accept that a large part of the surplus will be kept as retained earnings, unless an acceptable
rate of profitability on other investments (including their own farm) will be realized.
However, there are at least three forces pointing in another direction. First,
democrating decision making is likely to generate a merging of opinions along the lines of the
Blackwell and Dubins’ (1962) result. Second, democratic decision making is less vulnerable
to successful politicking because bad proposals are winnowed out (Tullock, 1992). Third, the
huge financial involvement of the financiers in the success of the cooperative is in general a
strong commitment to acquire substantial information in order to evaluate policy decisions.
4.2 Control systems
Internal as well as external control systems serve a role in disciplining corporate
decision making. Personal liability and the Board of Directors are considered from the former
perspective, whereas capital, corporate control and input markets serve a role in the latter.
PC seem to be a governance structure which handles the problems of failing internal
control systems particularly well. Four aspects of the input suppliers are responsible. First,
input suppliers have a large personal financial stake in the downstream firm. It turns out that
third parties are even willing to provide debt without any liability of the input suppliers when
they have generated a high level of ’inside’ equity. This equity stake held by agents provides
a credible signal that they will do their job of policing internal decision making well. Second,
section 2 has pointed out institutional differences regarding the organization of the Board of
Directors. They are favorable for the functioning of the Board of Directors in a MC. This is
enhanced by the feature of personal liability of (internal) financiers of the MC. This provides
input suppliers with strong incentives to collect information and force the Board of Directors
to take decisions in their interest. These incentives seem to provide a setting in which the
internal control system will work well. Both the organization of the Board of Directors and the
personal liability of their members imply that the incentives to put forth effort in the internal
control system of a MC are superior to those of a CF. Members of the Board of Directors of
a CF face much weaker financial incentives to implement good policies, which opens the door
for managers and members on the Board of Directors to realize certain personal goals at the
expense of the value of the firm.
16
There are several effects of external control systems. First, the recent curbing of the
disciplinary functions of the capital market in the USA frustrates corporate decision making.
It is obvious that the importance of organizational processes and procedures has increased
in order to compensate for the reduced disciplinary power of the MC. However, Jensen (1993)
argues that they often fail in CF. He posits that this is also due to the restrictions which have
been imposed on capital markets. One of the reasons for the failure of internal control systems
is
’the curbing of what I call active investors. Active investors are
individuals or institutions that simultaneously hold large debt
and/or equity positions in a company and actively participate in
its strategic direction. Active investors are important to a well-
16 These attractive features of a MC don’t imply that a MC necessarily functions better than a CF, because its
shares are not traded in the stock market. A CF with a listing on the stock market has commited itself to report
regularly and according to certain standards about its state of affairs. Another attractive feature of the publicly
traded CF is that additional external funds can be obtained by issuing new shares, whereas a MC often has to go
thru cumbersome negotiations with the providers of external funds.13
functioning governance system because they have the financial
interest and independence to view firm management and
policies in an unbiased way. They have the incentives to buck
the system to correct problems early rather than late when the
problems are obvious but difficult to correct.’
Second, the lack of the market for corporate control enhances the incentives for members in
a MC to generate a well functioning internal control system even further. Shares of a MC are
not traded in the stock market. Members therefore face difficulties in trading their financial
stakes. Stockholders can easily get out of a CF by selling their stock in the market. Members
of a cooperative can’t and therefore pay more attention to the way the cooperative is being
run.
17 Finally, a similar incentive is provided by the lack of a market for inputs. The absence
of a market for inputs eliminates for a MC the possibility of comparing its own performance
with those of rivals. It becomes therefore more attractive to put forth effort in the internal
control system in order to compensate for the absence of the yardstick of the market. The lack
of the market for corporate control and the lack of a market for inputs provides a commitment
to participate in the internal control system.
18
Notice that the superior functioning internal control system of the MC either creates
some leeway for either the input suppliers to advance an input price which is above the
market price, or not to provide the efficient level of attention in the internal control system, or
slack, or increase the financial reserves of the MC. However, the extent to which these
activities are allowed by the market depends on the level of asset specificity.
Figure 5 summarizes our account of the differences between MCs and CFs. It is an
extension of figure 3 in the sense that two hierarchial governance modes are distinguished:
cooperatives and corporations. A hierarchy is a cost minimizing governance structure in figure
3 when the degree of asset specificity of investments is higher then k2. Cooperatives and
corporations are examples of hierarchies and have therefore to be analysed in this domain.
The H(k)-curve of a MC is below (above) the H(k)-curve of a corporation when the advantages
of a cooperative outweigh (are smaller than) the disadvantages. Section 4.1 and 4.2 imply
that the H(k)-curve of a MC is steeper than H(k)-curve of a CF.
17 Holstrom and Tirole (1993) model the relationship between the liquidity of a market and the informational content
of prices. Markets with MCs are less liquid, because its shares are by definition not traded. Informed traders
(speculators) will spend less time on monitoring in these markets because it is harder for them to disguise their
private information. An implication is that the ability to design more efficient contracts to discipline managers is
reduced. Notice that this doesn’t affect a MC or a CF differently, because they have access to the same public
information, i.e. the stock price of CFs with a listing on the stock market. However, the MC is free riding on this
information, which seems to reduce the importance of the competitive yardstick argument in favor of MCs (Nourse,
1922, Sexton, 1990). Observe that this argument has probably more bite in the USA than in the Netherlands,
because the market for corporate control hardly exists in the latter country.
18 The incentives in a MC to participate heavily in the internal control system do not only have favorable
consequences for its functioning. Section 4.1 has pointed out that an often observed disadvantage of the MC is
that they are rather slow and conservative in their decision making processes compared with CF. This reduces their
flexibility and creates inertia with respect to their reaction to changing market circumstances. (An advantage of a
slow, democratic process with conservative voters may be that the approval of a policy decision will be carried out
fast and without much sabotage.) The additional problem of attracting new funds is addressed in section 3.3.14
Figure 5: Marketing cooperatives versus conventional firms
Figure 5 reflects a situation in which a MC may be an efficient governance structure.
The conclusion is that MCs may be a viable organizational form for intermediate levels of
asset specificity, i.e. k2 £ k £ k5.
19 (A MC will not emerge or disappear when the costs of its
governance structure are higher than those of a CF for every value of k higher than k2, i.e. k2
³ k5.) Figure 5 also indicates that the members of MC have some leeway to advance their
interests as input suppliers when k2 <k 5. This is costly for this governance structure. However,
market demand and competition by CFs provides an upperbound to the achievement of these
interests (Hart, 1983 and Scharfstein, 1988).
4.3 Financial differences
MCs have less freedom in their choice of financial structure than CFs, because their
charter requires member control, which precludes the design of an efficient number of
contingencies regarding the allocation of decision power. MCs are restricted to the use of non-
voting equity and debt as sources of funds, because MC members feel strongly that the
integrity of the MC is destroyed when control has to be shared with non-members. However,
internal financial constrains may force them to acquire outside funds. This is problematic in
the competition with other organizations, because the domination of control requirement will
most likely result in a higher premium for outside funds. Two crucial aspects of financial
instruments are responsible for this: the financial risk and the allocation of decision rights
regarding the use of funds. Asset ownership, i.e. those who carry the business risk, does in
itself not confer any decision making rights. However, CFs assign these two aspects in the
19 Observe that MCs are predicted in the above analysis from an efficiency point of view, with asset specificity as
the main determining variable. This hypothesis contrasts sharply with an evolutionary account of MCs. MCs emerge
in the framework of Arthur (1989) as historical accidents and their perseverance is due to increasing returns in the
form of path dependencies. MCs which were originally chosen became gradually locked in and were improved upon
little by little. The notion of long run efficiency doesn’t play a role in such an analysis because natural selection
processes focus on short run survival.15
design of their financial instruments to their outside equity holders. The reason is that there
is usually a negative relationship in financial contracts between the extent of decision-making
rights and the premium received for providing outside capital. External financiers must be
compensated with a higher premium when control rights are denied to them, in order to have
them provide significant funds. The domination of control requirement puts MCs at a
disadvantage compared to CFs in the competition for external funds, because they do not
allocate the decision-making rights regarding the use of outside funds to the outside financiers.
An inefficient level of asset specificity of new investments may be the result.
One of the stylized facts of a MC is that a significant amount of inside equity is
provided by keeping a considerable share of the profits as retained earnings each year. This
is often seen as a major advantage of the MC, because it provides an inexpensive source of
funds. However, it also has a disadvantage in the sense that it is a governance structure
which is more ’forgiving’ than debt. Inside equity provides weaker incentives than debt to
perform well.
5 Comparative statics
Markets for agricultural and horticultural products have evolved from a growth period
to a period of saturation. Current markets require specific investments in order to meet the
specific demands in the many niches of the market. The optimal value of k is increasing.
Comparative statics results regarding the choice of organization (5.1) and financial instruments
(5.2) will be analysed with respect to the change in market conditions. Section 5.3 formulates
a robust prediction regarding the change in the level of asset specificty and the choice of
organizational form.
5.1 Organizational attributes
The delivery/purchase requirement is a crucial aspect of a MC. It assures the MC of
raw materials, whereas CFs have to compete for inputs in the market. Especially shortage
markets seem to be attractive for such a requirement. Another feature is that it used to be an
important instrument in generating retained earnings. There was no market for inputs, because
all input suppliers were member of a MC. This implied that the Board of Directors of a MC
could exercise some discretion in the determination of the input price paid to the members in
order to build up the retained earnings. This situation was prevalent in the fifties and sixties
in Europe. However, markets for raw materials of MC are quite different today. Excess supply
is common, which is especially problematic for MC. In processing and in selling, growing
output made high investments in new capacity necessary in order to absorb the deliveries of
their members. This made MCs especially vulnerable to downward changes in input volumes,
resulting in lower prices paid to members. The Dutch cooperative pig slaughter houses are
an example. The 100% purchase requirement necessitated increasing slaughter capacity in
order to process the growing pig production in the eighties, which absorbed thereby the largest
part of the internally generated financial means. Investments in product and market develop-
ment with high levels of asset specificity in the form of products with brand names could not
be realized. Nowadays at low pork prices the MC face a tradeoff: if they pay too less for the
pigs, they have to face underutilisation losses because farmers sell the pigs to the private
slaughter houses, if they want to utilize capacity fully, they have to pay too much for the pigs.
This results in a disasterous financial situation. This could be partly offset by reducing the
100% delivery requirement, but will result in adverse selection problems (Akerlof, 1970).
Members sell the inputs with the highest quality in the open market, whereas the remaining
production is delivered to the MC (NRC Handelsblad, 1992). Another effect is that it16
undermines the ’organized trust’ perception of the members, which may result in more
cumbersome democratic decision making and a reduced willingness to approve investment
projects with a long horizon. It is further undermined by the tendency of MCs to respond to
these new circumstances by restricting free entry into the MC, limiting personal liability,
relaxing the one member one vote feature and reducing the non-transferability of return
claims. The viability of the MC seems therefore questionable when the attractiveness of the
purchase/delivery requirement is reduced.
5.2 Financial attributes
This section addresses the relationship between ownership structure and the costs of
equity and debt. The E(k)-curve of cooperatives will in general be above those of CFs. It is
not attractive for outside financiers to carry financial risks in cooperatives, because people with
(partially) different interests are allowed to spend the money of outside financiers in ways they
like best. Providers of equity have to be compensated for the lack of decision-making rights,
which is due to the requirement of member control. The value of k4 will therefore be higher
for cooperatives than for other organizational forms. This implies that there are values of k for
which a CF will use outside equity, whereas it is efficient for a cooperative to use other
financial instruments. The nature of these other financial instruments depends on the value
of k compared to k3. Debt will be used when k £ k3, whereas a hybrid form of finance will be
used whenk>k 3 .
There are several reasons why also k3 of a MC will be higher than the k3 of a CF. The
NCR (1990) mentions four aspects of MC which are likely to facilitate the acquisition of debt
from third parties. The delivery and purchase requirement between the input suppliers and the
MC does not only prevent adverse selection problems regarding the quality of inputs, but it
also enhances the continuity of the cooperative and reduces the fluctuations in the rate of
return. Second, there is free entry into MC, but members face an exit barrier. Free entry
entails not only that a new member has the same access to resources of the cooperative as
the established members, but also that he has gained equal rights to the returns in the
liquidation contingency. They have to either pay a fee when leaving (the Netherlands) or stay
for a minimum number of years with the MC (Germany). This exit barrier strengthens the
continuity and the predictability of the MC. Its main purpose, however, seems to be to prevent
attracting members whose only intention is to free ride on the existing resources of the MC.
It is a scheme similar to Lazear (1988) in the sense that wealth constraints regarding an entry
fee in order to obtain membership of a MC are circumvented by having payments spread out
over the membership period. Third, members are (to a certain level or even totally) liable for
the debts of the MC, depending on the structure of the MC. This makes the solvency of the
cooperative more sound, which creates extra possibilities to increase the amount of debt.
Fourth, members of a MC are usually required to pay every year a financial contribution every
year (by withholding part of the paid out price) in order to increase the reserves of the MC.
This also enhances the ability of a MC to acquire debt at favorable terms.
Figure 6 summarizes the above observations. It is an extension of figure 4. The cost
minimizing financial governance structure is drawn for a MC as well as a CF. It is assumed
that the Y(k) curve is the same for both organizational forms.17
Figure 6: Financial instruments as a function of governance structure
Our conclusions regarding the financial structure of MCs and CFs when MCs are
viable, i.e. k e [k2,k5], are summarized by
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MC : MCs and CFs use equity.
The driving force behind the choice of financial instruments in section 3.3 is that the
impact of the wealth constraint of entrepreneurs differs for each financial instrument. It is
obvious that a relaxation of this constraint by the internal generation of funds reduces the
hold-up problem of the use of non-voting equity by the MC. There are two sources of internal
MC funds: financial contributions by MC members and retained earnings. An important aspect
of financial contributions by MC members is the transferability of claims to returns.
Transferability differences between CFs and cooperatives are likely to affect investment and
capital formation. Equity shares of a CF can at every instant of time be traded in the stock
market, i.e. they are transferable. Members of a MC have only claims to the returns of assets
during the membership period. They often do not have individual and transferable ownership
rights in the assets of the cooperative. Returns during the membership period have therefore
to be at least as high as returns elsewhere. This limited appropriability problem requires that
the internal rate of return on the assets of MCs must be higher than that of CFs if internally
financed investment is to be chosen when the median membership duration is shorter than
the project’s recoupment period (Bonin, e.a. 1993). MCs using mainly internal funds to finance
capital will therefore ’underinvest’ relative to comparable CFs when a member’s individual
claim to the returns is non-transferable. The problem is getting worse due to adverse changes18
in the demographic composition of the member population. Retained earnings are also under
pressure because the delivery/purchase requirement is harder to maintain in the current
market.
The MC has a number of instruments available (section 4.1 and 4.2) which may
generate sufficient leeway to compensate for the restrictions on the choice of financial
instruments imposed by its charter. Members of MC face to a certain extent personal liability
regarding losses. An important effect is that it makes the MC less vulnerable to adverse
shocks than a CF, i.e. MCs seem to have the ability to survive a longer period of temporary
losses than CFs. Personal liability reduces the probability of liquidation in a multi-period
version of the model, because it reduces the wealth constraint in the ex post renegotiation
proces. This will increase the range of set-up costs k of projects which a MC can get financed
by outside investors. The delivery/purchase requirement and the personal liability features are
in principle able to compensate for disadvantages of the MC, but the change in market circum-
stances has undermined the strength of these two mechanisms. An inefficient level of asset
specificity of new investments may be the result. This applies especially to situations where
the size of the market grows faster, due to European integration, than the growth of
organizations based on internal means. The low financial reserves of Irish dairy cooperatives,
which is due to the poor financial situation of their members, forced them to drop their
requirement of member control in order to get a listing on the stock exchange (NCR, 1990).
They were not able to generate sufficient capital in order to finance the expansion of scale and
investments for product improvements.
MCs seem to have a different portfolio of banks from which they attract financial funds
than CFs. It is usually much narrower. Aoki (1990) has pointed out the advantageous
monitoring effects of having a main bank instead of many banks in an analysis between
different economic systems. It seems that the same arguments can be applied to different
organizational forms in one economic system. A closer relationship between an investor and
an extrepreneur implies that the investor receives a better signal regarding the bad state. It
reduces the degree of incompleteness of the ex-ante contract and therefore increases the
range of set-up costs k of projects which will be implemented.
Important differences regarding equity between the USA and the Netherlands are the
limited rights of shareholders and the virtual non-existence of the market for corporate control
due to the extensive use of anti-takeover measures in the dutch setting (Boot, 1993). The
providers of equity are the owners of the CF in the USA, whereas all kinds of restrictions are
imposed by the Dutch law on the rights of outside financiers. Outside equity holders in the
Netherlands receive a standard dividend, whereas the remaining part of profits may go to
employees and slack. Equity does hardly carry any control rights for the shareholders and
therefore doesn’t differ much from debt. This implies that the value of k4 is larger in the
Netherlands than in the USA, because E’ is almost the same as D’ in the former country.
20
The virtual absence of the market for corporate control is worse for CFs than MCs, because
the member control feature of MCs doesn’t allow much influence of this disciplinary
mechanism anyway. The value of k5 will be higher. MCs are therefore predicted to be (non)
viable at (lower) higher levels of k in the Netherlands than in the USA.
20 This is reflected in the empirical evidence. Stock price/earnings ratios in Amsterdam are by far the lowest in
Europe (Bennis and van Leeuwen, 1992). New stock is issued at 24 times the annual profits in the United States
of America, whereas it is only 12 times the annual profits in the Netherlands. These institutional features suggest
that dutch firms have on average a higher debt/equity ratio than american firms, which is supported by Remonola
(1990).19
5.3 System of attributes
Several attributes of a MC and a CF as a function of the level of asset specificity have
been addressed and are summarized in organizational and financial differences in figure 5 and
6. They have to be aggregated in order to say something about the efficiency of a particular
system of attributes. This can be done in many ways. Just adding up with equal weight the
organizational and financial differences results already in many possibilities, because the
slopes and the intersections of the various curves can’t be pinned down exactly in our
analysis. For example, an increase in the level of asset specificity may result in a switch from
a debt (debt, equity) financed MC to a debt (equity, equity) financed CF. Another possibility
is that the financial governance changes when the level of asset specificity changes, whereas
theorganizationalgovernancestaysthesame.However,therobusthypothesiswhichemerges
from all these possibilities is that an increase in the level of asset specificty will not result in
a switch from the CF-cluster of attributes to the MC-cluster of attributes.
6 Conclusion
This article has investigated some aspects of the viability and financial structure of the
MC. Contract theoretic notions have been used to analyse MCs. The analysis is mainly
comparative in nature in the sense that relative differences between different financial
instruments and different organizational forms were the focus of analysis. It has been pointed
out by Williamson (1988) that the choice of capital structure is closely related to the choice
of organizational governance. To quote: ’The corporate finance decision to debt or equity to
support individual investment projects is closely akin to the vertical integration decision to
make or buy individual components or subassemblies.’ This paper has shown that these
decisions are indeed closely related, but not identical.
We have argued that the complementarities between financial and organizational
governance results in the hypothesis that an increase in the level of asset specificity will never
result in a switch from a CF to a MC. The MC is likely to be an efficient, even superior,
governance structure for intermediate levels of asset specificity in markets which are
characterized by shortages. However, it seems that the transition of an economy from
shortage to surplus markets together with the limited financial capabilities of the MC members
reduces the (contract theoretic) viability of the MC. First, the disappearance of the shortage
situation makes members less indispensable for the MC. Second, the delivery/purchase
requirement can’t be maintained anymore, which results in cream skimming by downstream
firms and undermines the triad of (common) interest, (common) finance and (common) control.
Third, lower margins and technological advances have had an adverse effect on the
demographic composition of the member population, which drives MC into activities with an
emphasis on short run returns. Finally, the twofold construction of a society (of members) and
a company (economic institution), i.e. ownership of an adjacent stage in the production column
with the requirement of membership control, limits the asset specificity range of projects which
outside financiers are willing to fund.
An important topic for future research is to investigate the possibility of designing
financial instruments which on the one hand maintain the special cooperative character and
on the other hand eliminate the inefficiencies associated with this organizational form. Section
3 has addressed in this respect some interesting developments in the financial literature. This
seems not only applicable to the feature of domination of control by the members of the
cooperative, but also to the feature of the voting power of the members and the Board of
Directors. Voting power in cooperatives is usually not related to the amount of money invested
but to membership. Shares in a privately owned company determine the voting power of the20
owners, but this strong link between financing and voting is missing in cooperatives. Each
member in a cooperative has one vote, regardless of the financial stake of a member. This
seems problematic with respect to maintaining the largest, and usually most efficient, farmers
as members. However, they are a crucial element in the viability of the MC. Most solutions
which are nowadays considered within the MC structure consist of some differentiation in the
financial terms being offered to members. Examples are participating preferences share and
quantum discounts. It takes account of the variety between the members and may resolve
the horizon problem. This seems inevitable, even though it undermines the principle of equity
of members. However, the MC will most likely continue to face problems in competing
successfully with a CF. Both the low degree of indispensability of MC members in markets
without shortages and the low degree of complementarity between the post-harvest holdup
problem and the specificity of assets regarding the final product renders the vertical integration
aspect of a MC as an unlikely outcome from an efficiency point of view (Hart and Moore,
1990). Other solutions for the problems of MC challenge the viability of the structure of the
MC. Different organizational arrangements (association, participation company) may have to
be considered to address the specific problems of enterprises in agricultural and horticultural
markets, such as the lack of countervailing power when the MC is abandoned. It is obvious
that an integrated approach to organizational form and financial structure has in addition not
only to take issues like those mentioned in footnote 3 into account, but also fiscal and judicial
aspects.21
Appendix
This appendix addresses three issues. First, comparative statics results are formulated
regarding the model of Aghion and Bolton (1992). Second, the size of the hold-up problem is
defined.Finally,aformalrelationshipisestablishedbetweentheincompletecontractsliterature
and transaction cost economics.
Aghion en Bolton (1992) specify an investor and an entrepreneur. The investor cares
only about monetary returns, whereas the entrepreneur is also interested in non-pecuniary
benefits. The expected monetary return is gj
i and the private benefit of the entrepreneur is lj
i,
where i is the state of nature and j the action chosen. The state of nature is either i = g(ood)
with probability q or i = b(ad) with probability 1-q. The possible choices of action are j = g(ood)
or j = b(ad). The first best action j in state i maximizes total revenues gj
i +l j
iand is defined to
be action g(b) in state g(b). The incompleteness of contracts is reflected in the impossibility
of making ex ante contracts contingent on the state of nature i. However, they can be made
contingent on a publicly verifiable signal, s, which is imperfectly correlated with i. It is assumed
that b
g = Prob(s=gi=g) > .5 and b
b = Prob(s=gi=b) < .5. Monetary returns are assumed to
be verifiable, which allows for the use of standard incentive schemes. The set-up costs of the
projects are k. There are many wealthy investors. The entrepreneur has no wealth, but it is
assumed that he has all the bargaining power.
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The expected return p1(p2,p3) of preferred stock for the investor is obtained with a
renegotiation-proof (renegotation-proof in state b, partial renegotiation-proof in state b)
contract. The parameter tE(tp) is the share of the monetary returns which the optimal incentive
scheme allocates to the investor when equity (preferred stock) is used. Notice that investor
control (equity) becomes relatively less attractive than entrepreneurial control (preferred stock)
when tE decreases, i.e. an increasing tension between monetary and total returns may prevent
that the entrepreneur, due to his wealth constraint, is able to achieve the implementation of
the first best action plan in the ex post renegotiation process. This limits the size of projects
(k) under which first-best action plans are feasible. Similarly, entrepreneurial control becomes
relatively less attractive than investor control when tp decreases, i.e. an increasing tension
between private benefits and total returns may prevent that the investor adopts viable projects22
with high set-up costs. A (partial) renegotiation proof contract under which the entrepreneur
implements the first best action plan is too expensive for the investor when k is high, because
the entrepreneur has to be given a share of the verifiable returns in order to induce him to
choose the most desired action of the investor. Observe that ex-post inefficiencies in the
renegotiation process are due to the limited entrepreneurial resources, not to asymmetric
information between the parties.
A crude summary of the model is presented in figure 7. The parameter tE(tp)i s
inversely related to the tension between monetary (private) returns of the investor (entrepre-
neur) and total returns. Equity will implement projects with high k when there is not much
tension between monetary and total returns, whereas there is a large tension between private
and total returns. Similarly, preferred stock will implement projects with high k when there is
not much tension between private and total returns, whereas there is a large tension between
monetary and total returns.
Figure 7: Comparative statics of financial governance structures
The degree of incompleteness of the ex ante contract is measured by 1-b
g +0 - b
b ,
i.e. it is minimal (maximal) when this measure is 0(1). We define the size of the hold-up






b) represents that only feasible projects are considered. It is agrued
in the main text that the effect of the internal generation of funds is captured by a reduction
in k, the personal liability effect is reflected in 1-q and the relationship of the MC with banks
decreases 1-b
g +1 - b
b, especially b
b.23
Figure 8: Hold-up problem of financial instrument v
Figure 8 reflects that there is no (hold-up) problem (H(k/v)=0) with financial instrument
v when investment costs k of the project are lower than the profits of the investor (n(v)).
Similarly, an investor governed by financial instrument v will not participant in projects with set-
up costs k > p(v). Notice that the profits of the investor depend on v, where v is either E(quity),
P(referred stock) or D(ebt). It can be shown that equity is more attractive than preferred stock
(i.e. p(E) > p(P)) when the divergence between the monetary benefits of the investor and total
benefits is smaller than the divergence between the non-pecuniary benefits of the entrepre-
neur and total benefits.
Notice that the linear transformation W(kv) = w(v) + g(v)H(kv) with w(P) < w(D) <
w(E) and g(P) > g(D) > g(E) is able to capture qualitatively the relationship between incomplete
contracts and transaction costs economies. Notice that the models of Aghion and Bolton
(1992) and Williamson (1988) imply that the firm adopts only one financial instrument in
equilibrium. Firms employ debt as well as equity in the incomplete contracting model of
Dewatripont and Tirole (1992) because it provides a balance between excess passivity of
equity holders in managerial matters and the excessive interference of debtholders.
A stylized representation of the CF specifies it as consisting of two parties, an outside
investor and a manager. A MC is characterized by an additional party, i.e. the members. Our
focus is on the additional problems which emerge due to the introduction of this party. We
restrict ourselves to the relation between the outside investor and the members (and therefore
implicitly assume that it can be separated from the incentive problem surrounding the
manager.) A CF doesn’t have to consider any problem with its members, because it has none.
The first best action can always be implemented (, i.e. H(kE) = 0 for all values of k). This is
captured by structuring the payoffs in such a way that equity is able to achieve the first best,
i.e. assume that monetary benefits are comonotonic with total returns. A MC doesn’t have
access to (outside) equity, whereas a CF does. If the additional assumption is made that
private returns are not-comonotonic with total returns, then a MC will not implement all feasible
projects (, i.e. H(kP) > 0 for high values of k).24
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